3. Critical points of discussion in TC325

The reconstruction of the Standard reflects interesting social, political and cultural peculiarities as the backdrop for application of CPTED practices in Europe. The revision of the Pre-Norm after 2003 shows several changes that are indicative for the complex debate about the practical implementation of the CPTED idea in general. Here only two examples shall be presented.

Decision 1: Annex D – The Safety Audit Framework

In the 2002-version of the standard, Annex D consisted of a comprehensive matrix in three dimensions: Strategies and measures (respect the structure, liveliness, mixed status, visibility, accessibility, territoriality, surveillance, robustness, etc.) were given for very specific crime problems (fear of crime, burglary, vandalism, violence, car crime, theft and arson) at specific types of environment (residential, schools and youth facilities, commercial buildings and offices, shopping and retail, parks and public gardens, leisure centres, public transport and parking facilities, and town centres and public space). The critique about this matrix was not only its complexity, but more importantly, the fact that specific solutions were given to certain problems in certain kinds of places. Especially the French delegates challenged this approach, arguing that the precise recommendations were too narrow and deterministic to be applied in all European countries. This matrix would give preferences to certain problem-solutions which were not valid and applicable in all cultures and societies. In fact, the whole Standard was changed in a way not to give any solutions at all. The matrix in Annex D was transformed into a check-list of questions regarding various aspects of safety in a neighbourhood in order to support users of the Standard in a kind of “self-test” (figure 2). In total, the new “Safety Audit Framework” in Annex D contains 108 questions classified into the categories that correspond with the structure in the Standard: (1) Urban planning strategies, (2) Urban design strategies, (3) Management strategies.

Decision 2: No European Norm, please!

One of the most crucial changes in the development of the standard was taken in a resolution at the meeting of the Working Group in Paris in May 2005, where the delegates decided to abstain from the idea of working towards a European Norm (EN). The experts came to the conclusion that it is not recommended to develop a Standard on Crime Prevention by Urban Planning and Design in the form of a European Norm. Instead, the document was downgraded from the status of a Pre-Norm (at that time ENV, later called Technical Specification, TS) to a Technical Report (TR). A Technical Report is not more than a set of guidelines for planning authorities that can be accepted or ignored. Now it is up to the planning authorities in the European countries to employ the Standard, either in the form of developing an own National Norm on the basis of the Technical Report, or to implicitly adopt some ideas to their planning practice. The reasons for this decision are complex and can only be understood in the context of the political culture in Europe. Here I will give some clues for interpretation.

 1) Misunderstandings between members and political disagreements in countries due to a change of the political climate

The diversity of cultures in Europe entailed not only a “language problem”, but also different backgrounds for arguments and reasoning, which often complicated the process of finding a consensus between experts in the Working Group. More importantly, several inner-national conflicts between representatives of different institutions in one country hampered that process. Disagreements between the police, urban planners, architects, insurance companies, the Ministries etc. were often carried out in the meetings of the Working Group. These internal political conflicts were obscure and mysterious and could be observed in Italy, Austria, France, and Sweden. After political elections in a country, new members were appointed to the Working Group with different political views and background knowledge, which forced the group to review some points that had already been decided.

2) The demand for universal applicability in a cultural diversity

Experts in the Working Group had difficulties to determine universal guidelines for problem solution in a cultural diversity in Europe. Architectural styles, traditions in landscaping, housing technologies, insulation requirements according to the specific climate, the density of housing in inner-city suburbs or in housing estates on the periphery of cities and last but not least variations in building laws caused severe difficulties to find a common terminology in the guidelines to be universally applicable in all European countries and regions. Moreover, CPTED addresses practices of social control, which naturally vary significantly in Europe according to different balances of formal and informal control. A lack of collective efficacy and poor social capital may be compensated by a highly developed system of insurances and formal policing.

3) Addressing urban politics, not the market!

The Standard for Crime Prevention by Urban Planning and Design differs significantly from the majority of European Norms. Whereas norms in the building sector on sound insulation, thermal insulation, fire protection and alarm systems are usually composed by representatives from respective industrial companies, this particular Standard on crime prevention has been elaborated and reviewed by consultants on behalf of Ministries, the police and urban planning associations. Consequently this Standard is not addressed to industry and the economic sector but to public administration, housing associations and urban planning departments in city councils, who should be persuaded to consider security issues in their work. Without the usual drive of the market, so it seems, there is very little interest in a European Standard. The European Standard CEN/TR14383-2 follows a normative concept that prefers a “soft” and informal approach to social control and a comprehensive understanding of urban safety in contrast to the law & order dogma of surveillance and target hardening. However, its successful implementation depends on the good-will of politicians to support this ideology.

4) Security as social management in public space

In contrast to the standardisation of mechanical and electronic products like security doors and alarm systems, the CPTED-idea addresses the psychology of human behaviour in public space. The combination of “rational choice theory” and “routine activity theory” has led to an approach in crime prevention that intends to alter the immediate circumstances inherent in the local environment. This ideology was adopted by experts in TC325, and it was made clear that recommendations go far beyond target hardening methods. The “immediate environment” is interpreted as a complex situation of social interaction which is very difficult to be “standardised” in guidelines for urban planners. In short: The question of urban safety is not only a question of urban design but in the first place a question of social management in public space.

5) The urban environment is no product

This deviates from the traditional concept of standardisation in CEN, where products are tested under standardised conditions and certain failure criteria are determined. In contrast to burglary resistant security doors the social environment can not be subdivided in a classification system from “very resistant” to “least resistant”. Moreover, products can be tested under standardised conditions and certain failure criteria can be laid down, what then counts as the technical state-of-the-art for the quality of a product. The urban environment is interpreted as a “relational order of people and social goods in public space (Löw 2001, p. 154)”. Consequently, the application of the Standard for Crime Prevention by Urban Planning and Design can never be “tested”, and it can not be judged whether or not a neighbourhood has been designed in accordance with the Standard. At least this would lead to a never-ending dispute between experts. And this has severe consequences for questions of liability: Similar to a warranty, a client can sue a business if the product does not comply with the quality criteria as promised by the European Norm, but he needs to prove the failure of that product. If the city council contracts a housing association with the construction of a project and demands to observe that Standard for Crime Prevention by Urban Planning, and if in the end this area happens to become a crime hot spot, then the city council can sue the housing association for inadequate design. In case of the CEN/TR14383-2 this hypothetical case was especially considered critical in Austria and France, where city councils and the state take much responsibility for social housing, and here the state itself would have to be liable for the safety of housing projects.

Conclusion 1: Governance through norms has failed

The Standard CEN/TR14383-2 on “Crime Prevention by Urban Planning and Design – Part 2: Urban Planning” was approved by CEN on 21 July 2007 and published as a Technical Report in October 2007. No meeting was held since the last one in London in May 2006 and no further meetings are planned at this stage. The dust has settled and the focus has shifted to other Working Groups and guidelines in CEN/TC325 such as the security standards on petrol stations, schools and public transport facilities[1]. Experts in the Technical Committee 325 have abandoned their original ambition to urge national policy makers to gradually incorporate CPTED ideas into national building laws. Governance through norms and standards may be a good alternative to the top-down political process of EU-politics as long as products for the European common market are concerned. But the study on the genesis of the Standard CEN/TR14383-2 shows that the possibilities for the standardisation of the particular concept of CPTED are limited in Europe. It might have been a clever idea to slip CPTED-ideas into building laws “through the back-door” via international norms, but a European Norm seems to be the wrong instrument to accomplish that. Advocates of design-led crime prevention will have to stay with the traditional way of promoting CPTED on a local level, via training of staff in the police, public administration and architecture, using guidelines and manuals that are adapted to the local circumstances.

Conclusion 2: Trace the trickles!

A second consequence refers to further criminological research in that field. The status of a Technical Report has merely informative character to those who show an interest in the matter, otherwise the documents can be ignored. This makes it extremely difficult to trace the standard in local planning management and crime prevention strategies. Planning departments in city councils, crime prevention officers, housing associations and security consultants can implicitly refer to the guidelines made in the standard, they can adopt the suggested policy process and they can use the documents without explicitly referring to them. The guidelines for crime prevention by urban planning and building design will trickle away in bureaucratic systems, in the worst case these standards will be forgotten and disposed. Criminological research that is aiming at a thorough analysis of best practice examples and respective implementation practices with a prospect of CPTED-benchmarking in Europe will become extremely difficult.